The Army recently revised the Army Lessons Learned regulation to centralize the collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned. Historically, the Army has not sustained an effective lessons learned process. TRADOC has the lead for the Army in managing this process. TRADOC has attempted to create a more efficient process that may reduce effectiveness during combat operations in OEF and OIF. Today, the Army is facing a significant challenge to quickly capture lessons learned, analyze and redistribute them throughout the Army. Due to the complex environment in OEF/OIF and an adaptive enemy, doctrine and lessons learned are being derived at the unit level, redistributed and changed before TRADOC can adequately address and distribute them through doctrinal publications and military schools. The US Army Engineer School's Counter Explosive Hazard Center is currently integrated into the lesson learned process with regard to improvised explosive devices. The process is modified from the proposed lessons learned process. The Army lessons learned process and the Counter Explosive Hazard Center processes will be analyzed for efficiencies and effectiveness with recommendations provided to improve the current process.
EFFICIENT OR EFFECTIVE? AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM
General Scott Wallace, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, recently published his plan to transform the TRADOC institutions in conjunction with Army transformation plans. General Wallace declared that, "TRADOC's center of gravity is our ability to continue to learn and, as the "Architect of the Army," to adjust how we support the Army's operating force." 1 He has established a campaign plan with TRADOC's objectives. One of TRADOC's major objectives is to reshape the fundamental Army learning process for a dynamic operating environment. 2 A major component of this objective is the revision of the lesson learned process. General Wallace clearly stated that the Combines Arms Center's Center for Lessons Learned (CALL) would assume increased responsibility for the horizontal distribution of best practices across the Army. 3 In response, TRADOC has established the framework for a new lesson learned process within the recently revised and published Army Regulation (AR)11-
33, Army Lessons Learned Program (ALLP).
The previous lesson learned process appeared to be inefficient and ineffective. CALL tended to be a repository of lessons and the TRADOC institutions could not incorporate lessons into doctrine in less than two years. TRADOC recognized this shortfall and is seeking to maintain itself as a learning organization. The ALLP is a major means to transform, remain at the forefront of changes, and sustain the Army as a world class military instrument of national power. The ALLP attempts to centralize the collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned in a more efficient manner. The ALLP regulation can have tremendous significance in the Army's ability to fight the Global War on Terrorism. It is the means for the US Army to develop the "best practices" to accomplish the mission in theater and impact how our school institutions train the force and capture the lessons into doctrine. The Army must develop the tenets of a learning organization to effectively support the force in this constantly changing environment. Historically, the US Army has only emphasized lessons learned during combat 4 He concludes that there is not time to rest or the organization will be surpassed by its competitors. The Army can only accomplish the national objectives of our government as long as it can maintain its superiority over other militaries to accomplish national interests. The Army must be a learning organization to maintain its superiority which translates into a deterrent and effective fighting instrument. In recent years, the Army has attempted to conform to this model by developing and updating doctrine quicker than the existing bureaucracies. The Army has historically developed doctrine based on a wide range of inputs to include the changing operational environment, technologies, and theory and experience. The successful compilation of integrating these inputs into best practices and lessons learned results in new doctrine. The preceding methodology for capturing lessons was described in the previous edition of AR11-33 but it was not a formal reporting process. Lessons were submitted voluntarily and integrated based on the institutions assessment of trends in these lessons.
Lessons learned have typically been a TRADOC process where lessons are compiled from observations at training centers and integrated into the next doctrinal revision. The revised doctrine was then integrated into training plans and taught throughout the military education system. Today, the Army is facing a significant challenge in its ability to quickly capture lessons learned while at war and integrate them into doctrine and institutional instruction. Due to the complex environment in OEF/OIF and an adaptive enemy, doctrine and lessons learned are being derived at the unit level, redistributed and changed before TRADOC can adequately address and distribute them through doctrinal publications and military schools.
The US Army and its formalized processes for lessons learned has been a relatively recent practice that began during the Korean conflict. 5 The United States Army has a short history of collecting, evaluating and disseminating lessons learned. Historically, lessons learned have only had relevance during combat operations. Between combat operations, the systems to collect lessons ceased to operate. In World War I, the Army used the G5 position, training inspectors, to collect lessons and distribute them through a series of publications.
However, by the end of the war, the role of the G5 changed and the lesson learning processes concluded. 6 World War II would see the system resuscitated. By 1943, the deployed forces had learned how to report and assess their own usable combat experience. 7 The force remained intact (no rotation policy) for the preponderance of the war because lessons learned were maintained within the organizations. However, with the rotational policies of Korea and Viet Nam, lessons learned had greater significance with increased personnel turnover which required constant training for new personnel. The Army held its commanders responsible for reporting usable combat experiences where these lessons could be centralized and institutionalized. 8 The Korean War was a totally different experience than the Americans had fought in World War I and II. The enemy had more fluid tactics and included guerilla tactics. 9 The Army had implemented an individual replacement policy and it became imperative to pass on lessons to the training centers, schools and units in order to train new soldiers before they arrived in theater. 10 In 1951, the Army published Special Regulation 525-85-5, Processing of Combat Information. It provided procedures to "ensure the rapid and effective collection, evaluation and application of specific lessons learned in combat operations." 11 Unlike in the past, lessons were not distributed solely to forward units but to training commands and other schools in the US.
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The Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces (OCFF) became the central processor of lessons learned. On the other hand, doctrine development was decentralized to the schools that assessed the lessons distributed by OCAFF. The problem is that each branch school had to differentiate between doctrine and technique. 13 Therefore, schools made judgments and did not always incorporate the lessons into their institutions. However, the good news was that during the Korean conflict, there was an emergence of systematically collecting, evaluating and disseminating lessons learned. 14 Once again, after the conflict, the systemic processes ceased to function until the Army became involved in its next armed conflict more than a decade later.
In Viet Nam, the need to quickly capture lessons reemerged. In 1966, the Army mandated the Operational Report -Lessons Learned (ORLL). 15 This report originated at the Division level and flowed through the chain to HQDA and then was distributed to US Continental Army Command and US Army Combat Development Command. 16 In 1968, the ORLL was expanded to Battalion level for submission. 17 The experience of Viet Nam revealed that lessons learned traveled in both an inner circuit between operational units and an outer circuit through the institutions. By 1975, the processes eroded based on lack of use.
After another decade, the Army leadership was consumed and focused on a Cold War with the Soviet Union. The Army used the National Training Center (NTC) to train for an anticipated confrontation on the plains of Europe. However, the leadership realized that despite the huge investment in the National Training Center, there was no method in place to capture the warfighting lessons coming from that training center. 18 Concurrently, the aftermath of Operation URGENT FURY demonstrated that the services, including the U.S. Army, had no system to capture combat lessons. 19 In 1985, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) was established to collect lessons and disseminate them from experiences at the Army training Centers such as NTC. 20 CALL became a repository of information and lessons as opposed to a distributor of the lessons to incorporate into the institutions. TRADOC would eventually become the proponent for CALL and these lessons.
The Army made a significant realization by committing resources and sustaining the lesson learned processes, unlike its previous experiences. The Army continues to recognize the value of collecting lessons learned from recent experiences in OEF/OIF. As part of the Army's transformation, TRADOC is the new proponent for this practice and has developed processes to collect, evaluate and integrate these lessons learned into doctrine for practical application. In their attempt to establish a framework and centralize the process, they have lesson learned integration (L2I) process that has minimal process steps, reduced complexity, ease of assembly of instructor notes and lessons learned, and a date index to measure progress. 23 Six Sigma methods measure the process as observations, insights and lessons (OILs) move down stream and increase efficiencies. Cost savings identified provide for the reallocation of manpower to other projects. 24 The regulation directs all brigade-size and larger units to submit after action reports directly to CALL within specific timelines. This process has aided in the development of current doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for the Army. Doctrine is being the common framework of how the Army operates based on theory and experience. TTPs are based on doctrinal concepts and provide the details on the placement of forces in conjunction with the enemy and terrain within given circumstances and includes the prescribed steps to accomplish specific tasks. The approved procedure appears to centralize the process for more efficient analysis and dissemination to branches for implementation. The Army process should be analyzed for its ability to capture innovation and lessons in order to become an effective learning organization that can quickly identify a lesson and develop innovative solutions for the field forces.
There have been many organizational learning models developed in the last 20 years that have influenced the Fortune 500 businesses. Some of the most famous books include The Fifth Discipline, Lean Enterprise and Six Sigma. TRADOC has used the Lean Six Sigma methodology as a fundamental process of their transformation into a more efficient learning organization. We recognize that the Army is not a business for profit but it is a large organization that seeks to maintain its deterrent qualities by maintaining an innovative edge over the nation's enemies. George Huber also writes of learning organizations in a more holistic manner that we will use to examine the ALLP. Huber's learning model attributes are overarching of all the existing organizational models. They have common characteristics and attributes, which we will use to examine the Army organization and its lessons learned processes. We will then examine some common organizational obstacles to learning and assess the ALLP model's ability to overcome those obstacles.
George Huber identifies four essential attributes of a learning organization. First, the organization learns if any of its units acquires knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization. Second, organizational learning occurs when more of the organization's components obtain knowledge and recognize it as potentially useful. Third, with regard to information, more organizational learning occurs when greater varied interpretations are developed. Finally, organizational learning occurs when more organizational units develop uniform comprehensions of the various interpretations. 25 The first key attribute is that an organization learns if any of its units acquire knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization. Knowledge must enter the organization from a source, whether it is from experimenting or from practical experience. Once the knowledge is recognized, it then can be processed. The identification of new knowledge is merely the start point. Organizations begin with embedded knowledge that is inherited from their history and experience. From there, new knowledge enters the system and is assimilated which allows the organization to move toward accomplishing its mission.
The Army historically has focused on accumulating experience and knowledge during periods of combat operations. During periods of peace, the Army sustained itself with legacy knowledge from the last combat experience being passed informally. In the last 20 years, the Army has greater consistency in accumulating knowledge from war and peace time operations However, each subunit, in reality, will interpret information differently based on their experiences and the environment in which they operate. Organizations are also affected by the information load on the system. Interpretation within or across organizational units is less effective if the information exceeds the unit's capacity to process the information adequately. 30 Finally, we must consider the amount of unlearning that must occur. The military organization is a bureaucracy with engrained systems or subcultures. These systems are difficult to change and it often requires great effort to unlearn lessons and establish new ones. For example, the intelligence community recently struggled to unlearn how they analyzed the symmetric conventional enemy formations to learning how to template insurgency operations in urban terrain in the current war on terror.
Under the proposed methodology, "Commanders and staff at all echelons have a responsibility to submit observations, insights and lessons learned (OIL) products to CALL.
CALL is responsible for disseminating this information to the Army. Huber's fourth and final attribute is that organizational learning occurs when more organizational units develop uniform comprehensions of the various interpretations. Huber explains that the term uniform does not necessarily pertain to the perceived validity of the lesson but rather that the uniform understandings across units allow for different interpretations. 32 This information must be uniformly framed across units so they have a common reference that leads to communication between units and allows for cognitive analysis.
This is the most difficult attribute a learning organization must achieve to succeed.
Since Korea, the Army has framed its lessons within doctrine and distributed them in writing for uniform comprehension. It is these publications that have allowed different units to understand the lessons learned and apply them to their particular scenario. If the environment or enemy has a varying effect, they can communicate to their peers and discuss how and why this lesson learned or doctrine may or may not apply to their given situation. After Viet Nam, the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations heard testimony that Management: Lessons Learned, he explains that its human nature to be frustrated if searching for information on a database if it takes more than three clicks to reach their objective. 34 Also, a large complex database may prove too difficult for users to access, particularly if they use the incorrect search terms versus unit slang. Also, CALL must compete with various other websites from branch schools, independent databases and blogs sites. Unless CALL can centralize them or at least link them in a network centric fashion, the information may or may not be accessed. Using the identified framework, they recommend integrated solutions within the context of the current enemy behavior, the environment and the friendly situation. 39 This approach accomplishes an open network across the Army while at the same time creating a disciplined validation and integration process. It appears to be working for IED Defeat and may be the framework for other major lesson learned domains.
Finally, CEHC disseminates the validated lessons and TTPs through a plethora of means to the Army community. Venues for dissemination include through the lesson learned community such as CALL and headquarters of the combatant commanders and other services.
They distribute the lessons to the institutional training developers, other unclassified and classified web portals and to the training centers. They aggressively share the information through video-teleconferences with units and publications. They also share with allies and the international community. 40 They are the Army experts in this field. They strive to establish network connectivity with all communities involved in dealing with countering explosive hazards and saving soldier lives in theater.
Overall, the Army's new ALLP regulation is potentially a good first step toward establishing an efficient system to collect, analyze and disseminate Army lessons learned.
CEHC and the Maneuver Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri is merely one subsystem of a huge and complex organization participating in the ALLP. The Army has made a great stride in emphasizing the lesson learned process and attempting to centralize the effort.
The Army's desire to mainstream the process and reduce overhead is the most efficient means to overcome Huber's identified obstacles. However, it is not the most effective use of personnel and resources to return lessons learned back to the field. CEHC is an example of the current process being too complex to be centrally managed. The Army has hundreds of tasks it is required to perform. Expertise resides at the lower levels within the branch institutions to process the information that arrives from the myriad sources. CALL can maintain decentralized control but a centrally executed system may be an unreasonable expectation. Analyzing the ALLP with Doctor Huber's attributes reveals that TRADOC has made a good attempt at establishing a process that incorporates the efficiencies of the Lean Six Sigma methodologies. However, TRADOC should reconsider the complexities of the Army organization and the issues it confronts. TRADOC should balance the efficiencies it seeks to gain with ways to be more effective for the units and institutions it serves by leveraging the network centric links to where it subject matter experts are located. Then TRADOC could execute a process that is best optimized between efficiency and effectiveness.
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